Basics of Biosafety by Wong, Willy
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Objectives
• Review regulations and biosafety levels
• JSC Biosafety Facilities
• Biosafety cabinet usage and maintenance
• Exposure and Spill Clean-up
• Training requirements
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Biosafety Regulations
• NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 1800:
NASA Occupational Health Program Procedures,
Section 4. 1.1 Biosafety - mandates compliance
with CDC BMBL, ICAO, IATA
Acronym
IABSA—American Biological Safety Association
CDC- Centers for Disease Control
IBMBL — Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories
GAO — Government Accountability Office
CAO — International Civil Aviation Organization
HHS — Health and Human Services
IATA- International Air Transport Association
NIH — National Institutes for Health
USDA— United States Department of Agriculture
i WHO — World Health Organization
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National Actions Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations October, 2007
q American Society for Microbiology:
q Need to ensure adequate biosafety training
q Strict Compliance with NIH Guidelines and BMBL (CDC/NIH)
GAO report called for:
q Train lab staff in general biosafety
q NIH and CDC Testimony:
q Establishment of a Trans-Federal Task Force on Optimizing Biosafety Oversight,
consisting of representatives of a broad range of Federal agencies concerned
with biosafety risks
q Biosafety Curriculum Development and Biosafety Training
q Individuals with Certification
q Institutions with Accreditation	 r
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Biosafety Regulations
• CDC/NIH Biosafety in Microbiological and
Biomedical Laboratories
• NIH Guidelines for Research Involving
Recombinant DNA Molecules
• OSHA Bloodborne Pathogen Standard
• ICAO/IATA/DOT Transportation of
Hazardous Materials
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Select Agent Regulations
• Since September 11, 2001, two major pieces of legislation, the
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the "Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002" have changed the law
governing the possession, use, and transport of etiologic agents.
• A current list of select agents and other updates may be found at
the CDC Office of the Director Select Agent Program website,
http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap/index.htm.
• Civil penalties for violating the regulations may amount to $250,000
for an individual.
• Criminal penalties include a fine or imprisonment up to five years
for possession without registration or transfer of a select agent to
an unregistered individual.
^J
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Select Agent Regulations
Select Agents
- Microorganisms and toxins that have the potential to pose a
severe threat to public health (humans, animals, and plants)
and safety.
- The use and transfer of select agents is regulated by HHS and
USDA.
1) HHS SELECT AGENTS AND TOXINS
- Yersinia pestis, Ricin
2) USDA SELECT AGENTS AND TOXINS
- Foot-and-mouth disease virus
3) USDA PLANT PROTECTION AND QUARANTINE SELECT
AGENTS AND TOXINS
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Genetically Modified Materials
• NIH Guidelines for Research Involving
Recombinant DNA Molecules
• JSC Biosafety Review Board Form
644
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More Information on Regulations
Area Specific Plans -
OMOHC Tuberculosis exposure
control plan, Wyle BBP Program and
Wyle Chemical Hygiene Plan
For links to the national and international guidelines and regulations -
http://www.absa.org
Under resources and tools - Key topics and links
^J
Slide 9 of 65
^. - (I•
How Does Biosafety Impact Us?
Career -Suspension of Work
- Texas A&M Incident
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How Does Biosafety Impact Us?
Personal
- Texas Tech Incident
• Thomas Butler, an infectious disease specialist was
arrested and jailed in 2003 for the "mis-handling" of
Select Agents.
- Elizabeth Griffin Research Foundation
• In 1997, Beth Griffin, a research technician at Emory
University, died after contracting B-virus as a result
of inadequate prevention procedures and deficient
treatment after exposure.
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Biosafety at JSC
• Biosafety Review Board- The mission of the Biosafety
Review Board (BRB) is to identify, evaluate, control and
prevent biological hazards in conformance with NASA,
Federal and international health and safety regulations.
http://hefd.isc-nasa-gov/microbrb.htm
• The BRB includes a team of microbiologists, cell biologists,
physicians, industrial hygienists, and occupational health
professionals to assess the wide range of biohazardous
materials encountered.
• Biohazardous materials may consist of bacteria, fungi,
viruses, protozoa, cell cultures, and other infectious agents. 	 ^XJ
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Functions of the JSC BRB
• Operations — provide assessments of flight operations
regarding biosafety and potential exposure to crew-members
• Research — All biological materials for use in JSC facilities are
reviewed and approved prior to purchase.
• Payloads — All biological payloads are assessed and
biohazardous materials identified are assigned a NASA biosafety level
(BSL).
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Additional Functions of the BRB
• Conduct annual inspection of laboratories at JSC that
utilize biological materials.
• Train personnel in policies and procedures of
transporting biological materials.
• Maintain inventory of biological materials that are used at
JSC including select agents (SA) and genetically
modified materials (G O)
• Investigate incidents that involved biological materials.
• Obtain Transportation Security Administration
exemptions for hand-carrying of crew specimens.
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JSC Biosafety Review Board (BRB) Members
Microbiology - D. L. Pierson - Chair
Microbiology - Mark Ott
Microbiology - Wing C. Wong
Occupational Health - Sean Keprta
Occupational Health - Robert Martel
Clinical - Kathleen McMonigal
Clinical - Reta Warren
,fety - Wyle - Tom Samson
•	 Cell Biology - Neal Pellis
• Cell Biology - Tom Goodwin
Radiation - Honglu Wu
Environmental Factors - Bob Spann
• Astromaterials - Carl Allen
• Biosafety - Dee Zimmerman - UTMB/Health & Safety
• Biosafety- Debra Hunt - Duke University
• Administrative Specialist - Sharon Jackson
Biohazardous Materials Approval Form
To be completed by requesting, organization (all requested information must be h- led):
1. Name, title and affiliation: 2. Address (building, raom number, telephone number):
3. Description of biohazardous material:
4. Origin of biohazardous material:
Sa. List any pntenhll hazards to personnel:
Sb. Are humans susceptible to infection by this organism^. Yes qNo q
1s medical surveillance required/recommended? Yes q No m
Sc. Is immunization required/recommended' Yes q No m qq
6. Project location: Building(s) and room number(s) to be used for storage, analysis, and disposal:
7. Name(s) of personnel (scientists) handling materials: S. List all other biological research projects that may be
in, oh ed with this project and may present a risk of
cross-co u to mi ua tion:
9. Describe procedures on attached pages:
10. Will animals be used^. Yes ONo 0 If yes, please explain. (.Status of JSC ACUC Approval)
11. Will this project utilize any hype of regulated radiation? Yes qNom q If yes, please explai.. (Status of JSC
Radiation User Approval)
12. Name telephone number of NASA Technical Monitor: 13. Namer telephone number of Contract Laboratory Supervisor:
Signature and date: Signature and date:
To be completed by JSC Biosafeh - Re\ievi Board:
Approced(Disapproced:
Comments:
(Typed Name and Telephone Number of Chairperson) 	 Date
In-flight Biohazardous Materials Approval Form
Items 1-15 are to be com ileted by requesting or auization Mast be tv led
1. Principal Investigator Name, fide and affiliation: 2.Address (building, room...her, telephone and fax
.umber)
3a. Name of experiment:
3b. Name and Acronym of Pay load (if different than the name of the experiment in 3a):
4. Experiment Number and Acronym (If applicable):
-a. Shuttle' Mission Number:
Sb. International Space Station Expedition Number:
6a. Launch vehicle:	 6b. Launch date:
7a. Retur. vehicle: 	 7b. Returu date:
S. In-flight Storage Location: 9. In-flight Use Location:
International Partner Concurrence: q International Partner Concurrence:
qYes	 q No	 []Not applicable qYes	 ON.	 qNot applicable q
10. Please attach a detailed description of the experimental protocol.
Follow the checklist (A-H) provided below. Answer each letter in the checklist as thoroughly as possible.
Checklist:	 (to be completed for data submittal)
A.	 Provide the identification and origin of biological material.
B.	 Indicate if the biological materials (e.g., microbiological agents, animals and plants) are human pathogens or
contain pathogens.
C.	 Indicate the American Iype Culture Collection number (ATCC#), if known.
D.	 Indicate if cell cultures of human origin are free of Hepatitis A, B, C, HTLV 1& 2 and HIV 1302.
E.	 Indicate the maximum concentration of each sample.
F.	 Indicate the Biosafety Le y el (BSL), if known.
G. Indicate the maximum number of samples.
H.	 Indicate the maximum amount of microbiological agents per sample and the subsystem (i.e. vial, bag, s 3 tinge,
h'ay, canister, etc.
NOTE
Items A and B it 'e intended to be answered using a thorough descr iption.
** Items C thru H can be answered in a table format for simplicit y (see attached sample table fm'
reference).
11. 1s there a.} proprietarv v data?	 Yes q No q If yes, please explain.
Page 1 of JSC Form 713 Slide 16 of 65
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Biosa'fe	 eview Boa
JSC Form 712
Biosafety Review Board
Recombinant DNAIRNA Approval FormF. be completed by [equeslvrg c.ganicallon
t. Ilmc, tillc. ant u.• f lalim. 2. Addrecc {b.id. iB :p+m r.^.nFCr, :ckchary r.^.nhcr):
3a. De1,dp[on of bnM1azad p ua maUervl
Ab	 rMA q 	 rRh	 q
4. On9n d Lv'chssardws makrial:
lhee^r:rmml:vi ad b tuw	 Yes E]Nv q
5b. Are-,, d IM1e[dlabpra!asin [he—perimeal."—b, NI H7 	 ea	 ElNo El
5[. Is any d Uvc amH invdcd in [hccmcr:nml fundad by a NIH sshdanh p antra x'ocnM	 Yca	 q 	 `!	 q
8a Tyocs e-1- y:
6bIf the vecbr ae virus.dxa[hee>aerinmlhave[he p plenlial op irumxIM1e repicaun rapacity dvirus?
HfA q 	 Hp ElYee q 	 IaPeatryJ
Bc. llx d dere[B—k—A.—MO-7
MIA q 	 Ilo q 	 Y— E:1	 fsPecdYl
8d. Sin Ithe irmcA•lotal pcnwne:
8e. Nvlu^e uP lrrcANzcnuer.z:
Bf. Oaee the ir^aabai peer erzode a krom m[cgenc and'cr a knvm luvin4
No q 	 Yes q 	 tapccily}
gP- Dxx [he nsenM Bmnliral DNA In[egnle nl p ffn Mn genpme?
My q 	 Ycs q 	 tapxiiy7
9h. Prchin(al pr[d,ccti.
Si. T— of hptllcl.
81. Wvcld[his rcccarch alkcr:Iw MY. ranpcof [he. aBml'1
No q 	 Yes	 (e	 iro
Ak. WaJd[lie ruaeaiuh enheru lF¢virukrzedthe apes[, armdaamn^p^hpgen.:rrem[^
Na q 	 Yes q 	 tapecdy}
el. ^.	 ,er	 ^n<,ea:c vanemea,[^rny w[Ix age^•ezeM1
YesNo 
q a	
o^	 t^dY>
8m. Is dae e6f/4airved m the alc handling aN deranfamnelim pr¢cdurm fa This aBenL'f 	 Yes q 	 No q
8n la ndiral s[rvdl6nce rcquradrrommendad? 	 Yes q 	 No q
80. Ia immun'®['an r[quired.4[rnmmmdedY	 s q 	 No q
JSC Form 644
.^J
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BSL 1&2 Facilities at JSC
B7 — Biological Process Development Facility
B8 — Clinical Laboratory — blood, urine
B9 — Baseline Data Collection — blood, tissue collection
B14 — BEEST — human cell lines/cultures
B31 —Astrobiology — nanobacteria
B261 — Cardiovascular Laboratory - blood
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BSL 1&2 Facilities at JSC in B37
Microbiology -
Immunology -
Biosystems -
HACO-Core -
Clinical -
Pharmacology -
Radiation -
Muscle Research -
Nutritional Biochemistry -
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Biosafety Training Requirements
• Computer-based training every 2 years - all
personnel handling BSL 1 and 2 materials
Other related training-
• One-time JSC PPE course
• Annual BBP training - all personnel handling potentially
infectious materials - JSC or Wyle
• Annual Shipping of Biologicals training - personnel that ship
Exempt Human Specimens - Wyle Bioastronautics
• Shipping of dry ice - 2 years - personnel who ship samples
on dry ice - Wyle Bioastronautics
• Shipp ing of Infectious Substances - 2 ears - personnel that g
	 Y	 p	 ^
ship infectious substances - Saf-T-Pak or other
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Biosafety -Assessing the Risk
• What are you working with? and how much?
• What Risk Group is it in?
• Is it a Select Agent? GMO?
• Do you have BRB approval for use?
• Do you have the proper facilities, PPE,
disinfectants, training, vaccinations?
Slide 22 of 65
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Biosafety -Assessing the Risk
Risk Groups (RG)
— A classification of infectious microorganisms based on the following factors:
• Pathogenicity of the organism
• Mode of transmission and host range
• Availability of effective preventive measures (e.g., vaccines)
• Availability of effective treatment (e.g., antibiotics)
Risk classification for World Health Organization, Australia, Canada, European
Union, U.S.(NIH), and New Zealand:
Risk Group 1 (RG1) agents are not associated with disease in
healthy adult humans. E. coii K-12
• Risk Group 2 (RG2) agents are associated with human disease
which is rarely serious and for which preventive or therapeutic
interventions are often available. S. typhimurium/C.
neoformans/Hep. B
• Risk Grou p 3 (RG3) agents are associated with serious or lethal
human disease for which preventive or therapeutic interventions
may be available. Yersinia pestis/Histoplasma capsulatum/HIV	 r.l
• Risk Group 4 (RG4) agents are likely to cause serious or lethal 	 xJ
human disease for which preventive or therapeutic interventions
are not usually available. Ebola/Marburg/Monkey B 	 Slide 23 of 65
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Biosafety -Assessing the Risks
Biosafety Level (BSL)
- Biosafety Containment Level, handling practices, facility design;
not directly correlated to RG.
Used by CDC/NIH in "Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical
Laboratories (BMBL)"
BSL-1 is suitable for work involving well-characterized agents
not known to cause disease in healthy adult humans, and of
minimal potential hazard to laboratory personnel and the
environment.
BSL-2 is similar to Level 1 and is suitable for work involving
agents of moderate potential hazard to personnel and the
environment.
BSL-3 is applicable to clinical, diagnostic, teaching, research,
or production facilities in which work is done with indigenous
or exotic agents which may cause serious or potentially lethal
disease as a result of exposure by the inhalation route.
BSL-4 is required for work with dangerous and exotic agents 	 '^►^
which pose a high individual risk of aerosol-transmitted 	 •Jlaboratory infections and life-threatening disease.
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Biosafety -Assessing the Risk
• Currently, work at JSC is limited to BSL-1
and BSL-2 organisms.
• For complete list of bacterial, viral and
fungal agents and their corresponding
biosafety levels and risk groups, please
visit http://www.absa.org/resriskgroup.htmi
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Microorganism Risk
(Route of transmission, pathogenicity, ID)
Microbiological Risk Assessment
(Procedures, concentrations, Rx, host, etc.)
Biosafety Level (BSL)
1	 2	 3	 4 aw)
^*4WAJ
Universal Precautions
BSL-3 Higher Risk
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Biosafety -Assessing the Risk
BSL-2 differs from BSL-1:
• laboratory personnel have specific training in
handling pathogenic agents and are directed by
scientists with advanced training;
• access to the laboratory is limited when work is
being conducted;
• extreme precautions are taken with contaminated
sharp items; and
• certain procedures in which infectious aerosols or
splashes may be created are conducted in
biological safety cabinets or other physical
containment equipment.
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YReducing the Risk
Biological
- Use Attenuated or less virulent strains
• E. coii K-12
Physical
- Primary & secondary containment
• Primary: physical separation of hazard from worker
- PPE
- Equipment (biological safety cabinets, enclosed centrifuge
containers)
• Secondary: lab design, separation of hazard from others in
facility and the environment
- Separate labs, unidirectional airflow
• Risk Assessments/Safe Microbiological
Practices/Trai ni ngNacci nations	
.^J
Slide 29 of 65
.	 - ;'
Containment
• Containment is used in describing safe methods for managing biological
agents in the laboratory environment where they are being handled or
maintained. The purpose of containment is to reduce or eliminate exposure
of laboratory workers, persons outside the laboratory, and the environment
to potentially hazardous agents.
• The three elements of containment include laboratory practice and
technique, safety equipment, and facility design.
• The proper containment is located by identification of the risk group and the
appropriate biosafety level.
• The biosafety levels consist of combinations of laboratory practices and
techniques, safety equipment, and laboratory facilities appropriate for the
operations performed. They are also based on the potential hazards
imposed by the agents used and for the laboratory function and activity.
• As a general rule, a biosafety level should be used that matches the highest
Risk Group (RG) classification of the organism involved.
Slide 30 of 65
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Essential Containment Components
Safety
Equipment / PPE
Respiratory, Ingestion, Percutaneous, Mucous
Membrane
Safe Work Practices
onr,
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Breaking the Chaff Infection
Vaccines*,	
t
^^training, Rx*----	 1^
0 ".)	 ( 4%.0*
Lungs, Cuts,
Mouth, Eyes
if Transmission
Aerosolization
Lab manipulations
*Vaccines and Rx are covered in Blood Borne Pathogen training.
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Proper Biosafety Techniques
• Hands must be washed with soap and water frequently
during the day - after removing gloves, when gloves are torn
or damaged, after spills, and before leaving the laboratory.
• All procedures are performed carefully to minimize the
production of splashes or aerosols.
• Keep disinfectants and spill supplies close at hand.
• Work surfaces are decontaminated at the completion of
work or at the end of the day and after any spills.
• When working with sharps extra-care should be taken and
sharps should be disposed of in a hard-walled closeable
container.
Slide 33 of 65
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Proper Biosafety Technique
• Organize and plan work procedures with safety in mind and
keep an uncluttered work space.
• Eating, drinking, smoking, applying cosmetics, and lip balm
and handling contact lenses are prohibited in the laboratory.
• Closed-toed shoes are required in the laboratories.
Slide 34 of 65
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Biological Safety Cabinets (BSC)
• Biosafety cabinets are among the most effective and most
commonly used primary containment devices when working
with infectious agents.
• Biosafety cabinets complement careful work practices
because aerosols can still escape the cabinet.
Slide 35 of 65
Biological Safety Cabinets (BSC)
Class I
- Provides personnel and environmental
protection, but no product protection.
- It is similar in air movement to a chemical
fume hood (+ HEPA filter)
- For BSL 1-3.
- All filtered air (100%) is exhausted into the
lab or to the outside
F Room xlr
pk
 Cmitarninalei
air
q HEPA-filtered
air
r
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Biological Safety Cabinets (BSC)
- Class II Types A1, A2 1 B1 & 132
- Provides personnel, environmental, and
product protection.
- For BSL 1-3.
- Type Al - 70% of air is recirculated
NOT ducted to building exhaust
- Type A2 -100% is exhausted - ducted
to building exhaust
- Type 131  - recirculates 30% of the air
and exhausts 70%- ducted to building
exhaust
- Type 132 - exhausts 100% of the air
and ducted to building exhaust
Slide 37 of 65
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Biological Safety Cabinets (BSC)
- Class III
- Provides maximum personnel and environmental
protection. Also provides product protection.
- For BSL-4.
- Negative pressure.	 c
-	 rvAlDouble HEPA exhaust
- Heavy duty rubber lovesvY Y	 g 	^
C 1 v
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Biological Safety Cabinets (BSC)
• Inward directional airflow is what
protects you from the agents in the
cabinet - Do not disturb it!
• Things that disrupt flow include -
- Sweeping sideways motion in the cabinet.
- Repeated insertion and withdrawal of arms in and out
- Opening and closing laboratory doors in the vicinity
- Improper placement or operation of materials in the cabinet
- Brisk walking past a BSC during use k
Slide 40 of 65
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Proper BSC Work Practices
• Check calibration
and start-up BSC.
vv
• Allow to run for 20
minutes to purge the
air prior to working.
• Review procedure
and plan your BSC
layout -supplies,
equipment, waste
+ MA2!1H UC .
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Proper BSC Work Practices
• Disinfect cabinet and equipment going
into cabinet.
• Do not place items over front grille, do not
block back grille.
• Use plastic backed towels on work surface
to absorb spills.
Slide 42 of 65
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Proper BSC Work Practices
• Minimize movement of contaminated items
over clean items (work from clean to dirty).
• Perform work 6 inches back of front intake
grille.
• Clean items -front, contaminated -rear.
• Waste disposal area —biohazard bags and
disinfectant pans
Slide 43 of 65
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Proper BSC Work Practices
• Do not use a flame. Turbulence and filter
damage may occur.
• Equipment that causes turbulence(centrifuge, blender, etc.) should be placed
in back 1/3 of work surface. All other work
in the cabinet should stop while apparatus
is running.
• Remove contaminated items only after
sealed or decontaminated.
• Decontaminate after work is complete with
appropriate disinfectant.
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BSC Certification
• New/at least annually
• When moved
• After maintenance
• Maintenance should be performed by
NSF-certified personnel
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Clean Bench -
HEPA Filtered air
blows into the
employee's face
s
protecting the
samples —
not the employee
B 14
PC
'1-
J
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NOT A BSC!
x iI
Ductless fume hood —
Used for a variety of
chemicals,
but not for Biosafety.
X.^
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Proper PPE Work Practices
• Minimum PPE requirements for BSL-2 -
- closed laboratory coat, one pair of gloves and closed-toed shoes
• Eye protection or splash guards in place for work that will
produce aerosols.
• Wear PPE that is sized-properly.
• Don and doff gloves properly to prevent touching
contaminated glove surfaces.
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Proper PPE Work Practices
glove and labcoat practices
Incorrect	 Correct
.- ;I,
Secondary Barrier - BSLm2
• Lockable doors (a must for restricted agents)
• Sink
• Bench tops/furniture impervious and easily
cleaned
• Biological safety cabinet (if applicable)
• Eyewash/safety shower
• Inward airflow (desirable)
x.^
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Aerosol Production
Centrifuges - Use only sealed rotors or cups
Vortexing -
Rocking/shaking	 I ,
o
Lyophilization
Sonification^^
Tissue Grinding
Pipetting	 -O , qWA A^^
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Ring around
the
centrifuge!
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Aerosol Production - Pipetting
• Never blow out last drop in pipette
• Use pipetting aids with filters
• Discharge liquid down side of
container, using tip-to-wall contact
• Deliver as close as possible to
contents
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Vacuum Line Protection
• Fill flask with disinfectant to ensure
that when flask is 2/3 full
disinfectant concentration is
sufficient
• Empty flask when flask is 2/3 full
• Place disinfectant trap in a
secondary container
*Ideal - plastic or plastic-coated
flasks
*Label flasks with contents and
	 J
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Autoclave
• An autoclave is a steam sterilizer that is used for biohazardous laboratory
waste. In order to dispose of infectious laboratory waste (petri dishes,
pipettes, culture tubes, glassware, etc.), the waste must be autoclaved for
minimum of 15 minutes at 121°C (minimum 15 psi).
• The effectiveness of decontamination by steam autoclaving depends upon
various loading factors that influence the temperature to which the material
is subjected and the contact time.
• Particular attention must be given to packaging, including the size of
containers and their distribution in the autoclave. Containers must be
arranged in a manner that permits free circulation of steam.
• All processed items must have heat-sensitive tape, or other acceptable
method (such as commercially available strips or vials of Bacillus species
endospores or thermocouples), attached to confirm proper sterilization.
Once the cycle has been completed, the waste can then be disposed of as
medical waste.	
^^7v)
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Waste Disposal
• In lab - keep closed!
• Use appropriate container -
Plastic bags/cardboard
Red plastic bins are available for frozen items
• Do not over fill - 2/3 rule - must be able tie bags
and close box
• Label box before putting in storage - Name, date
and Room #
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Labels and Signs
• Warning labels shall be affixed: to containers of regulated
waste; incubators, refrigerators and freezers containing
blood or other potentially infectious material; and other
containers used to store, transport or ship blood or other
potentially infectious materials.
• Biohazard signs must be posted at entrances to all biosafety
laboratories. The labels shall be fluorescent orange or
orange-red or predominately so, with lettering and symbols
in a contrasting color.
• An Emergency Action Plan must also be placed in each
jk^*laboratory.
X-
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Exposure /Spill Procedures
*Choose appropriate disinfectant and PPE
*Treat and allow to disinfect for specified time
*Dispose of all wastes including PPE in Biohazard
•Sharps Disposal - plastic or cardboard container
Further information on disinfectant selection can be
found at
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Exposure /Spill Procedures
Needle sticks sharps incidence
- Notify supervisor
- Report to JSC Clinic for treatment
• If working with infectious agents,
report any febrile illnesses to your
supervisor.	 ,,,^
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Exposure /Spill Procedures
- Lab accidents survey
- human error (65%)
- equipment problems (20%)
- unsafe acts (15%)
- Accident-prone:
- ages 20-29
- men > women
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Spill Kits
Recommended kit contents-
1.gloves (several pairs)
2.Small disposable broom with dust pan, tongs, or forceps
3.Red medical waste bags
4.Disinfectant suitable for the biologically hazardous
materials found in the lab (check expiration dates)
5.Germicidal gelling agent (optional)
6.Paper towels
7.Diking material or spill pillows for large spills(optional)
8-Instructions for spill clean-up 	 J
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Transportation
• DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SHIPMENT
www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/^pregs
• SELECT AGENT TRANSFER TRACKING SYSTEM
www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/irsat.htm
• IMPORT AND EXPORT PERMITS FOR BIOLOGICAL
MATERIALS
www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfly/imprtper.htm
Organization specific protocols
IATA DGR training - specific to hazards being shipped X.^
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Recent Documented Exposures
E.coli 0157:H7,2005, Spina et al, J. C/in. Microbiology.
4 lab workers in different diagnostic labs infected.
Sudden increase in volume of specimens, low infectious dose,
prolonged survival on stainless steel surfaces.
Workers non-compliant with biosafety practices, including no
gloves, hands were not washed as needed, open lab coats.
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Recent Documented Exposures
Select Agent Exposures, 2006-7, Texas A&M
- 2006: lab worker infected with Bruce//a me/itensis
• Was not authorized to work with the agent (Select Agent
Program)
• Infected after reaching into the Madison Chamber to clean it
after aerosol work with B. me/itensis
n Infection was not reported for over a year to CDC
n 2 months after infection, 3 other lab workers exposed to
Coxsie//a ,burnetti (Q fever), but were not reported.
n July, 2007: CDC suspends research in SA lab
--
Science, Sept. 28, 2007
yr 4
mlavmipy^^
2002, 2003: E. coil 0157:H7 infections in two USDA labs
Bruceff4jS
I -
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BIOSAFETY BREACHES
Accidents Spur a Closer Look at
Risks at Biodefense Labs
2004: Three workers infected with tularemia, Boston University
2004 , Ebola needle stick (no infection?, USAMR111)
2004; Anthrax exposure (no infection), Children's Hospital, Oakland, CA
2004: Valley fever (C. immitis) infection, Medical College of Ohio
20€15; Potential Q fever exposure, Rocky Mountain Labs, Hamilton, MT
2006: Brucellosis infection, Texas A&M
